Article 2: Legal risks and the potential for disputes

Introduction

In a previous article, we explored the basics of Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) and Carbon Capture, Utilisation and Storage (CCUS) and took a quick look at some of the different policy and regulatory positions being taken in different countries.

With that background in mind, in this article we look at the legal risks that arise in the sector, and the potential for disputes. We will also outline key considerations for drafting dispute resolution provisions, tailored to the specific risks and multi-stakeholder environments characteristic of these projects. This guidance aims to support parties in anticipating potential areas of conflict and structuring robust, effective dispute mechanisms to protect their interests throughout the project lifecycle.

The prospects for disputes

CCUS projects involve both new and/or developing technology, and also complex multi-party contractual structures which often include government bodies.

The ICC’s 2024 Dispute Resolution Report illustrates the growing trend of disputes arising from sectors heavily impacted by climate change, with the top sectors being construction, engineering and energy, and the development of CCUS will likely contribute to future disputes. The 2024 statistics reported that disputes arising from the construction/engineering and energy sectors represented 44% of all new cases registered, or 193 (23.2%) and 170 (20.5%) new cases, respectively.

Construction Issues

As with all complex energy projects, something has to be built first – and where there are construction works, disputes inevitably arise.

From a construction perspective, projects can be built ‘from scratch’, involve new facilities being retrofitted onto existing infrastructure, or sometimes a hybrid of the two approaches. Each scenario brings its own challenges.

The contractual model adopted is likely to be a key driver of the nature of construction disputes in CCUS. In particular, how interface risk is managed between multiple work packages. Some projects will pursue a single EPC contract for the capture plant (or discrete EPCs for capture and compression), but transport and storage infrastructure is frequently delivered under separate packages (or by separate regulated entities) with different specifications, standards and completion regimes and potentially different financing and ownership structures. Where the delivery model is multi-contract, the project becomes highly dependent on effective interface management (design data handover, tie-in points, operability across pressure/temperature ranges, and responsibility for temporary works and commissioning support), and disputes commonly arise where gaps or overlaps in scope are only discovered late in the schedule.

Timing is also unusually sensitive because “mechanical completion” of one asset is not, on its own, enough to unlock value: a capture facility cannot reliably commission without a route to export CO2, and a transport system cannot demonstrate throughput without injected volumes and a storage site ready to accept. That creates potentially complex questions about critical path, access windows, interim operating modes and responsibility for delay.

Scope definition and change management is another flashpoint, particularly for retrofit and brownfield projects. Capture equipment may be installed onto operating industrial facilities with constrained space, restricted shutdown windows and legacy documentation of variable quality. Unforeseen physical conditions (as-built deviations, corrosion, contaminated ground, insufficient foundations, or conflicts with existing pipework and control systems) may drive late design changes, rework and claims for variations, time and cost. Where multiple owners or operators control adjacent assets (for example, a host facility owner, a capture asset and a separately owned transport and supply network), disputes can arise over access, isolations, outage planning and who bears the cost of host facility disruption, lost production and re-commissioning.

Commissioning and acceptance testing is often particularly contentious for first-of-a-kind or scaled technologies. Contractors and owners therefore need a clear understanding of appropriate test protocols and sampling/analysis standards ahead of time, and to take a sensible approach to provisional acceptance where upstream equipment is complete but downstream infrastructure is not yet available to take full volumes. Reliability runs, repeated trips, and performance degradation over the early months of operation can trigger arguments about whether the issue is a defect, an operational matter, or a consequence of the wider chain not being available in the way assumed at design stage.

Finally, CCUS construction programmes face “classic” project delivery pressures: long‑lead equipment and supply chain constraints, contractor capacity and evolving safety and environmental requirements, coupled with heightened scrutiny from regulators and local stakeholders. These pressures can translate into disputes about procurement responsibilities, specification changes and responsibility for delay. Given that many CCUS assets are large construction projects in their own right, parties also need to consider how rapid, interim dispute processes (such as statutory adjudication for onshore construction in some jurisdictions) interact with longer-form arbitration or litigation agreed in other project documents, and how remedies and security (retentions, bonds, guarantees) operate across an integrated but multi-contract delivery model.

Commercial Issues

Once the project is built, another area where issues may arise is in the commercial mechanics of the operations.

In the UK, a significant part of the risk allocation is increasingly being standardised through the Government’s CCUS standard form documentation (developed by DESNZ with the Low Carbon Contracts Company as counterparty for key revenue support contracts). Rather than negotiating everything from scratch, projects are expected to map onto a suite of templates that underpin the cluster model and set the baseline positions on payment mechanics, performance, and compliance.

From a dispute avoidance perspective, the practical point is that these standard forms address many of the contentious issues: definitions, CO2 quality/MRV, outage and curtailment rules, change in law, relief events and dispute processes, etc. As a result, parties’ scope to amend fundamental terms may be more limited.

As mentioned above, a recurring commercial challenge for CCUS projects is that the value chain is often “unbundled”. The party capturing CO2 may not be the same entity that compresses and transports it, and the transport and supply provider may be a distinct regulated network. That fragmentation creates interface risk: if CO2 is not delivered (or not accepted) at one stage, the effects cascade through the chain (lost revenues, tax credits or subsidies, and exposure to emissions penalties). Clear allocation of title and risk at each custody transfer point (including when CO2 is deemed “delivered” and when it is deemed “stored”) therefore becomes central to both bankability and to avoiding disputes.

Those interfaces typically need detailed performance terms and quality requirements in relation to the composition of the CO2. Projects therefore rely heavily on testing, metering and balancing arrangements (including calibration standards, data access and audit rights), and on agreed consequences for off-spec CO2 (rejection, blending, curtailment, price adjustments or cost pass-through for treatment). If things start to go wrong, allocating responsibility for sub-par performance or quality issues can be a complex issue, and generate disputes.

Monetisation can be equally complex. Revenues may come from a combination of: (i) avoided compliance costs (e.g. reduced carbon taxes/ETS exposure); (ii) policy support (e.g. grant funding, Contracts for Difference-style revenue support, or tax credits linked to verified capture and storage); (iii) third-party fees (e.g. a T&S tariff charged per tonne accepted and stored); and (iv) CCU sales (where CO2 becomes a feedstock). When multiple parties are involved, there is a risk of misalignment between who bears the cost of capture and who receives the benefit of credits or certificates, which can lead to disagreements and disputes down the line.

Finally, because CCUS economics are sensitive to high utilisation, the contracting structure often mirrors other infrastructure sectors: “take-or-pay” (for capture/emitters) and “ship-or-pay” (for transport capacity) arrangements, coupled with carefully drafted curtailment rules and force majeure provisions. Parties may also require security for performance and payment (parent guarantees, letters of credit, performance bonds) and, in financed projects, step-in rights for lenders if a critical contractor or operator defaults. Disputes frequently arise where problems occur with delivery or acceptance obligations, and ensuring back-to-back risk allocation and clear liability/indemnity regimes (including limits and carve-outs for specified losses) become particularly important at each stage of the chain.

Regulatory Risks

CCUS projects typically involve a number of permitting, licensing and consenting requirements, and the regulatory pathway is complex. Separate permissions may be needed for the capture facility (including environmental permitting and emissions reporting), compression and pipeline/ship transport (including hazardous substances and pipeline safety), and the storage site (including exploration/appraisal, injection, monitoring and closure). A common risk is misalignment of timings and conditions across these consents, and issues here may result in stranded assets and disputes about who bears delay costs.

Where transport and/or storage is provided as a regulated network service (as is increasingly the case in “cluster” models), access and capacity allocation rules can themselves drive dispute risk. Shippers may face changing tariff methodologies, queueing and priority rules, curtailment protocols or constraints imposed by regulators in the interests of system integrity or decarbonisation policy. If CO2 crosses borders (for example, being shipped for offshore storage in another jurisdiction), additional layers apply: export/import controls, marine permitting, and the interface between differing liability, MRV and certification regimes. Those cross-border frictions can affect whether CO2 is treated as “permanently stored” for domestic compliance or credit purposes, and may require re-documentation or re-verification at the boundary.

A further regulatory pressure point is monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV). Incentives and monetisation mechanisms (tax credits, CfD-style support, tradable certificates, ETS accounting) tend to be contingent on demonstrable, auditable volumes of CO2 captured, transported and stored, often measured to a prescribed methodology. The regulatory risk involves not only non-compliance penalties, but also the possibility of disallowance, revocation or clawback if data is later found to be incomplete or non-conforming, or if regulators tighten methodologies over time.

Long-term liability and stewardship are also defining regulatory risks for storage projects. Many regimes impose extensive obligations during injection and for a post-closure period (monitoring, remediation and reporting), backed by financial security instruments. The point at which responsibility can transfer from the operator to the state (if it can at all), and the conditions for that transfer, can materially affect project economics and insurability, as well as being a source of tension and of disputes. Uncertainty can arise where standards evolve or change over time, particularly likely in new technologies as they develop, potentially delaying closure sign-off and prolonging costs and contingent liabilities, or creating unanticipated issues and complications later down the line, leading to disputes.

Finally, CCUS policy remains politically sensitive and fast-moving, so change-in-law risk is ever-present. Governments may recalibrate support schemes, tighten permitting standards, revisit third-party access rules, or adjust carbon accounting rules (including the definition of “permanent” storage or the treatment of CO2 used for EOR/CCU). Parties therefore often seek some combination of regulatory-change pass-through, price escalation clauses, termination compensation and/or other stabilisation protections.

Cross-border investors should consider investment structuring to ensure protection under investment treaties, in case later state action destroys the investment. In that scenario, we can expect to see public law challenges and investment treaty claims arising in response to government actions.

Technical Concerns

CCUS projects bring a distinctive set of technical risks because they link multiple complex process systems into a single chain: capture and compression, dense-phase transport and injection into a subsurface store (and, for CCU, potentially onward processing into products). Even where each component is individually proven, integrating them at scale can expose pinch points in operability, reliability and safety, and those technical issues often become dispute triggers because they directly affect throughput, availability and regulatory compliance.

Because many obligations (and revenue streams) hinge on verified tonnes, technical risk is closely tied to monitoring and data quality. Metering and allocation across capture/transport/storage interfaces, reservoir surveillance (e.g. pressure monitoring, seismic surveys, tracer programmes), leak detection and incident response plans all need to be integrated and consistently governed. Disputes can arise where different datasets point to different conclusions (for example, whether a shortfall is due to capture underperformance, transport constraints, or storage injectivity), or where one party’s data is treated as the “source of truth” for regulatory reporting and credit claims. Clear protocols on data ownership, validation, access and expert determination are therefore as important technically as they are legally.

At each stage of the CCUS process there are distinct technical risks, and failures can have consequences that cut across safety, environment, performance and compliance. Such issues inevitably lead to disputes, and in particular challenges around the allocation of responsibility for technical uncertainty, failure, and remediation.

Procedural Issues

Many of these technical risks crystallise as disputes because CCUS is delivered through a chain of interdependent contracts. Parties may seek a coherent “contract architecture” across capture, transport and storage that lines up definitions (CO2 specification, delivery/acceptance points, measurement), allocates interface responsibilities (curtailment, planned outages, commissioning support), and provides a practical route to resolve disagreements quickly (for example, expert determination for appropriate parts of the chain and responsibility matrix).

While parties will typically have freedom to select their preferred forum or fora for any potential disputes, local procedures must also be considered. For example, in the UK, a statutory adjudication regime applies to construction projects which is intended to provide quick decisions on contested issues during the lifetime of a project. There are exceptions to the application of the statutory regime, including (for example) for offshore construction works, and so the interaction of the various dispute resolution options needs to be considered carefully.

In practice, a concise checklist of procedural and contractual protections will often do much to reduce dispute risk. This includes:

  • aligned remedies across the chain (including back-to-back caps, carve-outs and indemnities, and clarity on consequential loss and regulatory penalties);
  • credit support and security (guarantees, letters of credit, performance bonds) and step-in rights where a failure at one link can strand the rest of the system;
  • insurance and long-term stewardship arrangements for storage (including how post-closure obligations are funded and how liability is managed on transfer/handback);
  • a dispute resolution “ladder” that fits the project (negotiation → expert determination/adjudication where appropriate → arbitration/litigation), with thought given to how different fora interact across linked contracts; and
  • data, document retention and incident response governance (who holds operational/MRV records, how they are shared and audited, and how multi-party investigations are coordinated following an upset or leak).

Conclusion

CCUS is moving rapidly from concept to delivery, but rather than acting as a single project or a single contract, it is a chain. Construction risk is high in new technology projects such as CCUS, with complex contracting structures and a requirement for large-scale construction projects. Outside of the construction of the project, disputes most often arise at the interfaces: what volumes and what “quality” of CO2 were delivered, whether the network had capacity to accept it, whether the store performed as modelled, and whether the tonnes are verifiable for regulatory and revenue purposes. In the UK, the Government’s standard form CCUS documentation helps by setting baseline positions on many of these issues, but it does not remove the need for careful project-specific drafting. One practical takeaway is simple: invest early in a coherent contract architecture, clear measurement and performance regimes, and a dispute pathway fit for technical questions — because getting the interfaces right is usually preferable to arbitrating them later.

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