Home News & Insights BDW Trading Limited -v- Ardmore Construction Limited [2024] EWHC 3235
Introduction
Following the introduction of the Building Safety Act 2022 (“BSA”), the construction industry has had to grapple with the effect of this legislation and how it is to be interpreted against well established principles. Of particular importance to the industry is how the retrospective extended limitation periods under the BSA for claims under the Defective Premises Act 1972 (“DPA”) will be determined and specifically, whether such claims can be capable of being referred to adjudication.
Noting the industry now awaits the findings of the Supreme Court appeal in the judgment in URS Corporation Ltd v BDW Trading Ltd [2023] EWCA Civ 189 (heard earlier this month), the TCC has this month decided this question in BDW Trading Limited -v- Ardmore Construction Limited [2024] EWHC 3235.
Background
These proceedings related to an adjudication concerning fire safety cladding defects at a development known as Crown Heights in Basingstoke constructed by Ardmore for an SPV developer, The Basingstoke Property Company Limited (BPCL). The development achieved practical completion in 2003 and BDW benefitted from a post practical completion assignment of the relevant building contract.
In 2024 (some 20 years later and after 2 years of sporadic correspondence), BDW sought to refer a dispute over the defects to adjudication and an adjudicator, Mr John Riches, was appointed to decide the dispute.
The claim was advanced on two alternative grounds. First, a breach of contract and that BDW could rely on an extended limitation period on the grounds of deliberate concealment relating to the omission of cavity barriers. Second, a breach of the DPA.
Ardmore denied the Adjudicator had jurisdiction over a DPA claim, that the works were not to its order and relying on the section 1(2) exception in the DPA – noting a BDW company had specified in the Employer’s Requirements the use of an EPS render system with combustible materials which would necessitate remediation in any event.
The adjudicator decided in BDW’s favour on both grounds including deliberate concealment as Ardmore had not specifically brought the omission of cavity barriers to BDW’s attention – despite BDW not being the Employer under the building contract and BDW’s group company being the contract administrator under that building contract and visiting the site regularly to witness construction and value work.
The proceedings concerned the enforcement of the adjudicator’s decision in BDW’s favour and the judgment of Joana Smith J confirms that even with the unusual features of the case such as the staleness of the project and availability of contemporaneous evidence, that contesting enforcement of such decisions is extremely difficult.
However, in deciding the enforcement proceedings the Court had to decide whether the adjudicator had jurisdiction to decide the claim advanced by BDW under the DPA. Put another way, could a party to a construction contract in respect of which claims are otherwise limitation barred, use the extended limitation periods under the BSA to refer a claim under the DPA to adjudication?
A claim under the DPA
Claimants taking advantage of limitation periods extended by the BSA often do so by relying on the DPA duty arising out of s1(1), which provides that:
A person taking on work for or in connection with the provision of a dwelling (whether the dwelling is provided by the erection or by the conversion or enlargement of a building) owes a duty—
(a) if the dwelling is provided to the order of any person, to that person; and
(b) without prejudice to paragraph (a) above, to every person who acquires an interest (whether legal or equitable) in the dwelling;
to see that the work which he takes on is done in a workmanlike or, as the case may be, professional manner, with proper materials and so that as regards that work the dwelling will be fit for habitation when completed.
The Court of Appeal considered important questions of principle relating to DPA claims in URS Corporation Ltd v BDW Trading Ltd [2023] EWCA Civ 772. Amongst other issues, the Court of Appeal considered the application of s1(1) and found that it was a duty not limited to “lay purchasers”, meaning that developers, such as BDW, could be (and in that case, were) owed a duty under the DPA. This question is being decided by the Supreme Court and the industry awaits that judgment.
In this case, BDW claimed that Ardmore owed it a duty under s1(1)(a) of the DPA because Ardmore provided works to BDW’s order as, inter alia, it was the beneficiary of an underlying agreement for lease. Ardmore argued that its obligations under the relevant building contract were to BPCL and not BDW and to decide otherwise would extend the principle in URS beyond a party with a contractual relationship with the other. The adjudicator decided the works were to BDW’s order as the effect of the assignment was that BDW had stepped into the shoes of BPCL as if it was always the Employer under that building contract.
Jurisdiction over the DPA claim
The building contract was based on an amended form of the JCT 1998 Standard Form of Building Contract With Contractor’s Design and set out at Article 5, that disputes or differences “under” the contract could be referred to adjudication. This was consistent with S 108(1) of the Housing Grants Construction and Regeneration Act 1996 (as amended).
Article 6 of the building contract stated that “any dispute or difference as to any matter or thing of whatsoever nature arising under this Contract or in connection therewith…shall arise between the Parties…it shall be referred to arbitration…”
The question the Court had to decide was the meaning of the words “under the contract” in Section 108(1).
Ardmore contended that Articles 5 and 6 clearly showed the contract draftsman intended the words to have a limited scope given the wider wording used in Article 6. As such, the words “under the contract” did not include a claim under the DPA and therefore the adjudicator had no jurisdiction to decide the claim.
BDW contended the words were to be given a wider interpretation and that the Court’s reasoning in Fiona Trust (which deprecated linguistic distinctions in interpreting arbitration clauses) applied equally to adjudication provisions.
The Court’s judgment
In deciding this question, the Court carefully considered the Fiona Trust reasoning, the authorities relied on by each party including Hillcrest Homes Ltd -v- Beresford & Curbishley Ltd [2014] EWHC 280 ,Aspect Contracts (Asbestos) Ltd -v- Higgins Construction Ltd [2015] UKSC 38 , J Murphy & Sons -v- W Maher and Sons Ltd [2016] EWHC 1148 and Bresco Electrical Services Ltd -v- Michael J Lonsdale (Electrical) Ltd [2020] UKSC 25.
Joanna Smith J decided that the Fiona Trust principles did apply to adjudication for, amongst others, the reasons set out below.
The Court was not persuaded that the Fiona Trust principles did not apply because the building contract was agreed long before the decision in Fiona Trust.
The Court also dealt with whether there was any significance in the differing words used in Article 5 (adjudication) and Article 6 (arbitration). The Court must objectively construe the words of a contract in their relevant documentary, factual and commercial context. Given the Court’s findings as to the applicability of the Fiona Trust principles, the words of Article 5 should be given a wide meaning unless there was clear language to the contrary.
Here the parties to the contract are likely to have intended any dispute arising out of their relationship to be decided by the same tribunal whether adjudication or arbitration. The nature of the adjudication process and its purpose (to decide disputes quickly and effectively) support this view.
Finally the Court stated its views were reinforced by the wording of clause 2.5.2 of the building contract. This stated:
“Where and to the extent that this Contract involves the Contractor taking on work for or in connection with the provision of a dwelling or dwellings the reference in clause 2.5.1 to the Contractor’s liability includes liability under the Defective Premises Act 1972…”
Clause 2.5.1 being a deeming provision providing that the Contractor would have “like liability” to the Employer as would an Architect or other professional designer. The Court considered it odd if the parties had intended such like liability under the building contract to be excluded from consideration by an adjudicator by reason of the wording of Article 5.
Conclusion
The implications of the Court’s judgment will be awaited with interest but it is likely that parties advancing or defending fire safety claims will now see adjudication as a valuable tool in their armoury.
In the meantime, Ardmore is preparing for arbitration and awaits the Supreme Court’s judgment in the URS appeal which touches on the issues in this case.
Gurbinder, Lucy and Oliver acted for Ardmore Construction Limited in these proceedings.
Posted by: Gurbinder Grewal
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