Home News & Insights Energy Dispute Series – Investor-State Dispute Settlement in the Energy Sector
The global energy sector is, again, undergoing profound transformation. The accelerating transition to net‑zero economies and the development of new energy sources is being impacted by increasing geopolitical tensions and a resurgence of resource nationalism. These factors shape how states approach the exploitation and regulation of their natural resources and how investors assess risk. The global political system is imposing significant pressure on international law and the international legal order underpinning the unprecedented globalisation seen in the past 80 years.
Investor–state dispute settlement (ISDS) sits at the centre of these issues, mediating the friction that can arise between sovereign regulatory autonomy and Government policy and the rights of investors who have expended significant effort and capital making investments in other countries. In this article, we navigate the changing landscape of investor-state disputes in the energy sector, identifying key current and future challenges and what disputes may arise.
I. Energy security: a structural driver of disputes
Ensuring uninterrupted availability of energy resources at an affordable price in an increasingly energy-reliant world is undoubtedly one of the major challenges our society as a whole has to face. Energy security has become increasingly fragile as demand skyrockets, energy systems face geopolitical conflict, cyber risks, volatile weather and investment shortfalls.
As we move towards a more (power hungry) digitalised society, governments and energy players have to balance the transition towards net zero with meeting an ever-increasing demand and the need to produce affordable energy to the general public, further complicated by regional conflicts.
The main threats to energy security are:
The energy sector has always been subject to geopolitical dynamics and the risks that go along with capital-intensive, long-term, and cross-border investments. However, in 2026 the global system seems particularly volatile, and anything that increases political risk and uncertainty for investors is likely to lead to a rise in problems for foreign investments and, therefore, a rise in ISDS. These pressures have direct impacts across the energy sector, affecting oil and gas projects, renewable and sustainable energy projects, and critical mineral mining.
II. The rise and evolution of resource nationalism
The concept of resource nationalism
Resource nationalism describes measures by which states assert greater or total control over natural resources (particularly strategically valuable ones such as oil, gas, rare earths and minerals), from audits and licence conversions to fiscal re‑design and mandatory state participation.
Although it can take the form of direct expropriation of assets/projects, with the recent growth of ISDS it is increasingly more common to see instances of indirect expropriation resulting from government action that is presented as necessary to implement a specific policy. For example, changes to the legislative, fiscal or regulatory environment, outright changes in policy such as bans on particular projects, or new requirements for existing projects to progress to the next stage.
For example, Africa’s energy potential is vast (with abundant solar and other renewables capable of supporting regional and global transition objectives), yet under‑utilised. Quite apart from oil and gas, Africa is estimated to have 40 per cent of world’s total solar potential, and 60 per cent of the world’s best sources of solar, hydropower energy, wind and geothermal energy. It is also estimated that approximately 6% of lithium resources (central to the energy transition) are located in Africa.
Such dynamics can incentivise governments to intervene more aggressively in domestic energy markets, particularly where they perceive that the current system does not protect the state’s interests. Abrupt regulatory shifts can adversely affect foreign investors’ contractual rights and legitimate expectations under investment treaties, driving a steady flow of disputes to arbitration. Recent measures across Africa demonstrate the trend: Senegal’s scrutiny of resource contracts and stronger local‑content rules; Burkina Faso facing claims regarding the Sanutura project; DRC’s mining policy tightening; Nigeria’s reported mining licence suspensions; Zambia’s proposed Minerals Regulation Commission; Mali’s 2023 mining code enabling up to a 35% state stake; and Namibia’s export restrictions on unprocessed critical minerals.
Nigeria’s Petroleum Industry Act 2021 (PIA) exemplifies comprehensive regulatory transformation. The PIA aimed at consolidating institutions, converted NNPC into a commercially oriented entity, introduced hydrocarbon tax and corporate income tax, mandated community‑development contributions, tightened environmental obligations, and penalised routine gas flaring.9 While the reforms seek transparency and investment in deep‑offshore assets, conversion requirements and acreage relinquishment can materially affect legacy rights – issues commonly channelled to ISDS through treaty protection or arbitration clauses in investment contracts.
Similarly, Indonesia recently imposed a new requirement that exporters in the mining, plantation, forestry and fisheries sectors retain all their foreign exchange earnings in Indonesia for a full year (compared to 30% for 3 months previously), with a prohibition for funds to be held offshore or at foreign bank branches operating in Indonesia and use of earnings restricted to specific purposes set out by the Indonesian government.
Resource nationalism beyond developing regions
Resource nationalism is not confined to developing jurisdictions. In the United States, President Trump’s policies (in the context of growing economic tensions and competition with China) have emphasised domestic production of fossil fuels and sought to build rare‑earth supply resilience through tariffs and state‑backed investments. The last few months have seen a significant step-back in commitments to phasing out fossil fuels, the latest of which being the Trump administration’s immediate suspension of all leases for offshore wind farms already under construction in December 2025, invoking national security risks.
III. The climate transition as a catalyst for disputes
Net‑zero commitments are reshaping regulatory environments globally: emissions‑reduction targets, flare‑reduction mandates, environmental‑remediation obligations and changes to renewable‑energy subsidy frameworks.
EU law adds a distinctive layer: the Court of Justice’s case law on the Energy Charter Treaty and the treatment of investment‑arbitration awards has created a large degree of uncertainty for intra‑EU claims and award enforcement.
Against this backdrop, ISDS claims increasingly test whether climate‑related measures violate the fair and equitable treatment standard, frustrate legitimate expectations, or amount to indirect expropriation; and whether police‑powers and public‑interest defences suffice to justify the measures.
It has often been argued by opponents of ISDS that the system hinders the energy transition by enabling oil and gas companies to bring claims. However, large numbers of arbitrations are brought relating to renewable energy projects, where changes in government policy towards such projects have given rise to claims. As policies towards the climate transition change and evolve more rapidly and the need for critical minerals mining continues to increase, we expect energy transition issues to continue to drive investment treaty claims.
IV. Procedural and substantive trends in ISDS
Disputes increasingly concern indirect interference with investments rather than outright takings, with states mounting carefully crafted public interest defences (including climate necessity). A vocal constituency has been working to dismantle the ISDS system, or to reduce its significance, as a result of fears that it unfairly protects the interests of large corporations and penalises states. The policy arguments are weak: many ISDS claims are made by smaller companies and individuals, who lack the alternative means of negotiating solutions to problems that truly large corporations can have, and in many cases the existence of the investment treaty network is an important reason why investors are comfortable making significant foreign investments in the first place. However, the polarisation of positions regarding the desirability of ISDS means that such claims need specialized expertise to navigate procedural and substantive dynamics.
Damages debates focus on volatile commodity prices, discount‑rate construction, scenario analysis, and the distinction between commercial risk and sovereign interference; respondent States often revert to arguing for negative or sunk‑cost valuations, particularly for early-stage projects.
And in the current environment, enforcement remains central: even amid state‑aid and procurement‑law challenges – most visible within the EU – treaty awards benefit from the enforcement architectures of the ICSID Convention and the New York Convention.
V. The future of ISDS in the energy sector
Looking ahead, we expect to see new investors increasingly assessing the possibility of entering into investment contracts with Host States, particularly for large-scale projects, to mitigate increases in political risk. We also expect to see investment disputes continue to emerge, and potentially increase, across the energy and natural resources sectors.
Some of these disputes may arise in new areas of the sector, such as carbon capture and storage, hydrogen networks, and battery‑storage projects. Others, however, may arise from changes in geopolitical policies/approaches, such as issues over export bans and processing mandates for critical minerals, claims tied to tariff resets, fiscal reforms, and ESG‑driven project cancellations. We also face the likelihood of future disputes arising from increasing nationalism from certain states, on the one hand, and increased intervention by superpowers, on the other hand. The Russian invasion of Ukraine spawned numerous investment claims (going back to the Crimea in 2014), and an increasingly interventionist US administration (for example, the action in Venezuela) raises the prospect of significant impacts on global energy sector projects going forward, which could result in ISDS claims.
Ongoing treaty reform and the phase-out or modernisation of legacy instruments may shift some claims from investment treaties to arbitration under investment contracts, with treaty planning becoming routine for project sponsors.
Conclusion
Despite criticism from some quarters, ISDS remains a vital framework for balancing sovereign regulatory prerogatives with investor protections in the energy transition. As disputes become more technical, geopolitical factors come into play, and breaches of investors’ rights become more subtle (with states becoming more sophisticated), early risk assessment, robust contractual allocation (including stabilisation and economic equilibrium mechanisms), and careful selection of dispute resolution fora will be increasingly decisive.
Posted by: Alice Andreoletti and Alexander Slade
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