Home News & Insights When Contractual Payment Machinery Means Exactly What It Says
Netomnia Ltd v MJ Quinn Integrated Services Ltd [2026] EWHC 1824 (TCC)
The TCC reinforces the importance of payment applications complying with the contract and provides a useful reminder of when Part 8 proceedings can be used to finally determine issues arising out of an adjudicator’s decision.
The Technology and Construction Court’s decision in Netomnia Ltd v MJ Quinn Integrated Services Ltd [2026] EWHC 1824 will be of immediate interest to construction lawyers, commercial managers and project administrators responsible for administering payment mechanisms under framework and construction contracts.
The dispute before the Court concerned a claim for declaratory relief arising out of an application for payment of only £3,770.84 which had been referred by MJ Quinn to an adjudicator, Mr Jensen on a “smash and grab” basis. The application formed part of a wider batch of 168 applications (valued at approximately £4.7 million) submitted by MJ Quinn on the same day in the same form.
The case therefore raised again the question frequently encountered on construction projects: how strictly will the Court enforce contractual requirements that govern the content and form of payment applications? The TCC’s answer was clear: strictly and especially where the contractual requirements serve a genuine purpose.
Background and Issues
Netomnia is the operator of a national fibre-optic network in the UK. MJ Quinn is a contractor engaged in the design, installation and maintenance of telecoms infrastructure. Both parties entered into a framework contract for construction works to expand and maintain the Netomnia network called the Master Services Agreement (“MSA”). The MSA contained a familiar payment regime.
Clause 6.5 required MJ Quinn’s Application for Payment (“AFP“) to:
MJ Quinn’s AFP the subject of the dispute (much like the 168 others in near identical form) identified only the relevant Work Order and did not identify:
Netomnia argued that the Polygon ID and Feature ID were information reasonably required to verify accuracy pursuant to clause 6.5.4. As the judgment records, a Polygon ID was a collection of premises within a geographically defined area in the city or town serviced from a relevant exchange. A Feature ID was a reference to the particular parts of the infrastructure to be provided within a polygon such as the construction of a chamber or installation of a cable.
MJ Quinn succeeded on a “smash and grab” adjudication before Mr Jensen in respect of its AFP arguing no effective payment or pay less notice had been served by Netomnia. Netomnia sought CPR Part 8 declaratory relief that Mr Jensen’s decision was unenforceable on the grounds of a breach of natural justice as it was insufficiently reasoned and/or decided the dispute on a basis neither party had advanced. That claim for declaratory relief was not admitted by MJ Quinn but it did not offer a defence either. The proceedings therefore turned on this second declaration sought.
As it had in the adjudication, Netomnia argued in its claim for a final determination of the underlying issue that the AFP was “not in accordance with the contract” for the purposes of section 110B(4) of the Housing Grants Construction and Regeneration Act 1996 (as amended). As a result, it could not be relied upon by MJ Quinn for the purposes of a “smash and grab”.
MJ Quinn sought to argue that the proceedings were inappropriate for determination using the CPR Part 8 procedure and that in the alternative, the Court should not grant the relief sought on several grounds:
The Court disagreed with MJ Quinn.
Clause 6.5.4: Verification Information is Not Merely Administrative
The most important aspect of the judgment is the Court’s treatment of clause 6.5.4. MJ Quinn argued that the omitted information was unnecessary because:
Mr Justice Eyre rejected that approach. The Court emphasised that the phrase “reasonably required in order to verify the accuracy of the invoice” had to be assessed in the context of the parties’ actual commercial arrangements. Those arrangements involved:
Against that background, the Court held that Netomnia was entitled to insist upon the identifiers which its systems needed to validate claims. Importantly, the Court approached the issue from the perspective of the operation of the contractual payment machinery and not by asking whether Netomnia could somehow eventually work out what the claim related to.
That distinction is critical. The question was not whether the information could ultimately be discovered. The question was whether the contractor had supplied information that was reasonably required for verification within the short timescales governing payment notices and pay less notices.
As the Court observed, the due date for payment was the date of the application and Netomnia only had five days under clause 6.6 to issue its payment notice, and only 14 days from the due date to make payment.
Clause 6.5.5: Purchase Orders Matter
MJ Quinn also failed on clause 6.5.5. The clause required the AFP to reference:
“the corresponding Purchase Order for the applicable Services and/or Deliverables“.
MJ Quinn advanced two arguments.
First, MJ Quinn argued that it had not been properly provided with the relevant purchase order. Second, that the purchase order did not “correspond” to the claim because the AFP sought payment for indexation and permit costs rather than the original contract sum for Services/Deliverables recorded in the purchase order.
Neither argument succeeded. The Court found that Purchase Order PO-008324 had been sent approximately two and a half years earlier to MJ Quinn (which MJ Quinn conceded).
The judgment is also useful in clarifying what constitutes a “corresponding” purchase order. Mr Justice Eyre held that the relevant purchase order remained the corresponding purchase order because it related to:
The fact that MJ Quinn claimed indexation just increased the amount otherwise payable under the purchase order did not alter that conclusion.
The Failed Scheme Argument
MJ Quinn advanced an interesting alternative case. It argued that if clause 6.5.5 required a purchase order reference in circumstances where no usable purchase order existed for the work claimed, the payment mechanism would fail to comply with section 110(1) HGCRA, which requires an “adequate mechanism” for determining what payments become due.
The consequence, it said, would be the replacement of the contractual machinery by the Scheme for Construction Contracts. This argument never gained traction because the Court found that a corresponding purchase order had been provided and applied to the work claimed in the application.
The use of the CPR Part 8 Procedure
For practitioners, perhaps the most interesting feature of the case lies in the Court’s findings in relation to the use of the CPR Part 8 procedure. The dispute arose following an adjudicator’s decision that the AFP was valid. Rather than resisting enforcement on conventional grounds and recognising there were 167 further applications, Netomnia commenced Part 8 proceedings seeking declaratory relief and a final determination on the underlying issue of contractual interpretation.
MJ Quinn argued that its case involved the determination of an argument relating to estoppel by convention and that deciding the declaration sought by Netomnia required a detailed factual account. Therefore the Part 8 procedure was inappropriate as the estoppel issues required the determination of substantial issues of fact.
MJ Quinn issued an application for a finding to this effect and directions for disclosure and cross-examination pursuant to CPR Part 7. The Court dismissed the application (heard at the outset of the hearing of the Part 8 claim) finding there was no substantial dispute of fact and that the estoppel argument was not of sufficient force to require the exchange of further evidence. To the extent that there were differences on the facts between the parties, they were in large part matters of nuance and emphasis or are capable of being resolved by reference to undisputed contemporaneous documents.
Conclusion
The central message of Netomnia v MJ Quinn is straightforward: where parties agree detailed requirements for payment applications , the TCC will ordinarily enforce them according to their terms.
The decision also demonstrates the continued willingness of the TCC to use CPR Part 8 proceedings as a mechanism for resolving questions of contractual interpretation arising out of adjudications, even where there may be some factual nuance. The mere allegation of a substantial dispute of fact being insufficient for the Court to depart from doing so.
Gurbinder Grewal and Georgina Barlow acted for Netomnia instructing Thomas Crangle of 4 Pump Court.
This article is intended as general commentary only and does not constitute legal advice.

